Complete STIQRA manual

Privacy, security, and data

STIQRA keeps your reading library, saved articles, reading history, filters, and other reading preferences on your device by default. It contacts the websites you follow to get article updates from their feeds (lists of updates, often called RSS or Atom), and may contact those sites for images or audio when you use those features. It does not send your normal feed requests through an XMAKYNA-operated news server.

You decide when to use optional iCloud Sync, open a publisher website, share or export content, or send material to another app. Those actions can move information beyond STIQRA. This guide explains what to expect and where the limits are.

Optional iCloud Sync

When you turn on iCloud Sync, supported reading data is also stored in your private iCloud database so it can be used on your other STIQRA devices. This can include website addresses, reading and saved status, limited article titles or summaries, filters, selected preferences, reports, and transcripts. The app does not sync passwords, downloaded audio or images, or your entire downloaded article bodies through this feature.

Apple encrypts iCloud data in transit and at rest. With Advanced Data Protection, eligible protected iCloud fields and files receive Apple's end-to-end encryption. STIQRA cannot tell whether that Apple account setting is enabled, and it does not manage its own separate cloud-encryption key.

See iCloud Sync for the full list of synced and device-only categories, how to turn it off, and what happens when you delete local or cloud data.

How STIQRA approaches security

STIQRA treats publisher content, imported files, remote URLs, redirects, images, audio, clipboard data, and incoming handoff values as untrusted until the specific feature boundary has checked them. Passing one check does not grant broader authority: for example, a public HTTPS URL that is safe to contact is not automatically an approved subscription, credential target, browser destination, or file to decode.

Security-sensitive work is split into narrow stages such as source authorisation, network destination checks, bounded parsing, media preflight, safe display, persistence, and explicit external handoff. Some hostile-input work runs in dedicated helper processes so a parser or native decoder receives less authority than the main app. These controls reduce exposure and make failures more containable; they do not claim that Apple operating-system components, native decoders, networks, publishers, or recipient applications can never have vulnerabilities or outages.

What these protections do not guarantee

STIQRA's controls reduce risks from untrusted material; they do not protect a device with a compromised operating system, maliciously modified hardware, a jailbreak/root compromise, or an attacker with equivalent administrator or debugging authority. They cannot establish trust in a compromised build, signing, distribution, or device-management environment. Keep the operating system and app updated, and install only trusted releases.

A safely displayed publisher claim is not a verified fact. STIQRA's parser and display controls do not certify publisher accuracy or editorial honesty. Subscribing to a source does not make its content trustworthy. Nor does direct feed access provide anonymity: publishers, Apple, network operators, and other providers may observe traffic or account activity under their own policies.

STIQRA does not guarantee network, CloudKit, publisher or storage availability, fixed sync timing, perfect backup durability, or deletion of copies retained in backups, screenshots, recipient apps, browsers, exports, or shared destinations. After you choose an external handoff, that destination governs its own retention and disclosure. These limits do not excuse defects in STIQRA's documented controls.

Memory-safety protections on supported devices

Supported Apple devices can provide additional protection against certain memory errors. STIQRA opts in to Apple's Enhanced Security protections on compatible signed builds, including hardware memory tagging where the device and operating system support it. These protections may stop affected app processes when certain memory errors are detected. They do not prevent every security issue or prove that an older device is unsafe.

To see which protections the running app can report, open Settings → Security & Privacy → Open Security Features Audit. The results depend on the app build and device, not just the model name.

Shipping code and external services

STIQRA's shipping code is built from XMAKYNA-owned Swift code and Apple platform frameworks. It has no third-party code packages, advertising SDKs, analytics SDKs, or tracking SDKs. Apple system frameworks are platform dependencies, not third-party software packages bundled by STIQRA.

This does not mean STIQRA never communicates with external systems. Feed and image retrieval goes to sources you select or authorise; retired article-page text fetching is not performed. When iCloud Sync is enabled, STIQRA uses Apple's CloudKit/iCloud infrastructure, an Apple-operated external platform service rather than XMAKYNA-operated infrastructure. Optional external handoffs remain explicit user actions. The ChatGPT handoff does not embed an OpenAI SDK or OpenAI API package. These runtime services and destinations are different from embedding third-party software libraries inside the application.

Supported translations use the on-device Apple Translation framework. Apple may independently collect API usage and performance metadata, such as app identity and source or target languages, but not the original or translated content through that API. See Translation for details.

Supported platforms and security floor

STIQRA requires macOS 26.5 or later on an Apple Silicon Mac, or iOS/iPadOS 26.0 or later. Intel Macs and older system versions are not supported. These minimum versions are part of the app's security requirements.

STIQRA checks untrusted website and file content before using it and separates some sensitive operations into restricted helper processes. Some tasks, including system clipboard actions, translation, speech playback and iCloud transfers, use Apple system features directly. Those system features and the services you choose to contact have their own limits and security risks.

If a temporary file import, export, or audio transfer expires, start that transfer again. A failed transfer does not authorise STIQRA to skip its normal checks.

Local-first behaviour

STIQRA stores feed data, read state, saved state, archive state, history, filters, track keywords, metrics, feed-fetch audit history, image cache entries, reports, generated-audio files and metadata, same-device audio queue/resume state, bounded publisher-audio listening history, explicit publisher-audio downloads, and related preferences locally on your device.

Most organisation features, including filtering, ranking, For You topic categorisation, search, metrics, and feed diagnostics, are designed to work without sending your reading library to a remote analytics service. For You topic preferences and cached article categories stay on device.

If STIQRA keeps a diagnostic copy of a corrupt local store after recovery, it keeps one copy per store or sync-metadata category, capped at 64 MiB. A later recovery replaces that copy; an oversized copy is discarded. Startup maintenance removes diagnostic copies older than seven days. These copies are local troubleshooting material, not automatic restore sources, and this cleanup does not remove your custom backup files or active recovery work.

Local-first does not mean the app never uses the network. It means the normal network path is tied to the work you asked STIQRA to do: fetching your configured feeds, loading article images when image loading is enabled, or opening a destination you choose.

Local-first does not mean application-level encryption. STIQRA does not currently encrypt its local stores with a project-owned key. The app sandbox, iOS data protection, a device passcode, FileVault, and encrypted device backups can protect data at the operating-system level, but those are Apple or user-managed protections rather than encryption implemented and controlled by STIQRA. On iPhone and iPad, STIQRA first applies protection available after the first device unlock to its canonical Application Support directory and the critical existing store files required at startup. Other historical files and subdirectories are migrated by restartable background work, and existing durable snapshot files are protected when accessed. These stages do not mean every historical nested file was already migrated before the first screen opens. The first-unlock policy permits supported background refresh or playback after the first device unlock. Preferences, cache and Documents locations, noncanonical legacy files, platform-managed URL caches, exports, and backups keep their own platform or destination policy.

Protect your Mac and device storage

We strongly recommend enabling FileVault (full-disk encryption) on your Mac. You can enable it in System Settings. Keep your Mac updated and use a strong login password. FileVault helps protect local data when a Mac is shut down, lost, or stolen; STIQRA does not enable FileVault, manage its recovery key, or check whether it is on. FileVault does not stop a running, unlocked Mac or an authorised process from accessing files it is permitted to read.

Only grant Full Disk Access to other Mac apps when it is necessary and you trust the app and its developer. Review and revoke unnecessary grants in System Settings → Privacy & Security → Full Disk Access. This broad permission increases an app's potential access to protected user data; it does not automatically override every app sandbox or Keychain boundary. STIQRA does not require you to grant other apps Full Disk Access. Keep macOS and iPhone/iPad updated and protect mobile devices with a strong passcode; Apple device, backup, and account settings remain your responsibility.

Application Support and preference data are not explicitly excluded from platform-managed backups by the current source. Cache directories may be purged by the operating system. Platform backup behaviour depends on your device and backup settings. Files you export or share follow the storage, synchronisation, backup, and access rules of the destination you choose.

Direct access to user-approved publisher sources

STIQRA is not a central news service. The app connects directly to each enabled RSS/Atom feed whose exact public HTTPS origin you approved for that subscription, with XMAKYNA out of the normal content path. XMAKYNA is not a required proxy, and one approval does not become a global publisher allowlist.

Before first contact, STIQRA displays the normalised initial origin for your approval. When an approved publisher returns an HTTP redirect, STIQRA can follow a limited chain to another safe public HTTPS host (such as a feed-hosting service) without a new approval prompt. Every hop must pass the current URL, destination, redirect, request, and resource safety checks; redirect authority lasts only for that request chain and is not saved as a new subscription grant. The contacted public hosts may see your network address, request time, and requested URL details, including any identifiers supplied by the publisher. Foreground and background refresh use the same persisted initial-origin capability. Auto Refresh is a separate explicit opt-in: when it is off, automatic service entry points remain inert, and a stale iOS background task queued before the setting changed is rejected before background bootstrap or feed work. Images and explicitly initiated publisher-audio downloads have separate settings and safety boundaries.

Publishers can still share a CDN, DNS provider, hosting company, or bot-defence service. Feed Stats can help expose those shared failure patterns without creating diagnostic-only feed probes.

Feed request caching

For efficient RSS/Atom refresh, a publisher may return an HTTP ETag or Last-Modified validator with its feed. On a later request to the same feed resource, STIQRA can send that value back in a conditional HTTP header. A publisher response of 304 Not Modified lets the app skip downloading and parsing a full unchanged feed. These requests do not send your locally stored articles or reading history to the publisher.

STIQRA stores accepted feed validators in local app data, including across a force-quit and relaunch. Each validator belongs to an exact feed resource; it is not shared with unrelated feeds or synchronised between your devices. Stored validators expire after seven days of inactivity, but a successful refresh can renew their lifetime. Removing a feed clears its current requested/final-resource validators; Clear RSS Cache clears all cached feed validators. This is an HTTP transport optimisation, not an extra feed subscription or a separate network service.

Fewer hidden surfaces

STIQRA is designed to do the reading job directly. XMAKYNA does not add tracker, advertising, or analytics calls to the normal reading workflow. STIQRA does not require an XMAKYNA fetch service in that path.

That matters because every extra network, SDK, parser, renderer, background task, or service can become another thing that fails, tracks, drains resources, or exposes the app to content it did not need.

Auto refresh is Off by default for new installs. If you leave it Off, STIQRA should not schedule app-owned periodic feed refresh in the background; use manual refresh when you want the latest articles now. When you enable auto refresh, STIQRA may perform periodic feed checks tied to that setting, subject to platform rules.

STIQRA contacts the public websites you choose to follow and, if images are enabled, the sites hosting their article images. It checks incoming data before using it. Opening a browser, sharing, exporting, copying, or sending content to another app may also contact an external destination. Those actions do not mean STIQRA adds its own advertising or tracking service.

A feed can advertise a link that contacts other services before reaching the content you requested. This is particularly common with podcast audio: an episode link can pass through several audience-measurement or advertising services before reaching the audio host. Each service returns the next address as an HTTP redirect. This can happen without opening a browser or showing a separate screen for each service.

For example, a captured New York Times The Daily feed enclosure included Podtrac, pdst.fm, vpixl, pscrb.fm and swap.fm in the address before its Simplecast audio endpoint. Publishers can change these links and services; this example is not a permanent list of destinations or a claim that every episode follows the same chain.

Each contacted service can observe the request it receives, including the connection's public IP address, request time and URL path/query. A publisher may include episode or tracking identifiers in that URL. With a VPN, the service normally sees the VPN exit address. HTTPS encrypts traffic in transit; it does not hide a request from the service receiving it. Refusing cookies does not prevent this kind of measurement.

STIQRA does not add these tracking services, but following a publisher's audio link can still contact them. An explicit publisher-audio download can follow up to ten redirects, with public HTTPS and destination checks at every step. It does not forward cookies or sign-in credentials. Those safety checks do not prevent measurement by the contacted services. Extra redirects can also add delays or fail before the audio file is reached.

Refreshing a feed does not download its podcast audio. To avoid the audio redirect chain, leave publisher audio undownloaded; the feed fetch itself still contacts its own publisher and hosting infrastructure. See Audio for the explicit download and playback workflow.

Secure ingress and safe display

STIQRA checks content from outside the app before using it. This includes publisher feeds (article lists), images, imported files, generated reports, copied text, and information shared with other apps. Depending on the content, STIQRA may limit what it accepts, reject it, or display it in a safer form. These checks do not guarantee that the information itself is accurate or trustworthy.

These checks also apply to backups, reports, audio information, and content you copy or share. They reduce the risk of unsafe files or links, but cannot guarantee that information from the internet is accurate or private.

When you select a file to import, STIQRA reads a checked copy rather than opening the original file again. System-provided file pickers and export controls handle access to the files you choose; not every direct file-export destination is supported on every device.

Feed URL safety

STIQRA accepts only public HTTPS sources that work without a login. It checks addresses and redirects, and blocks private-network or otherwise unsafe destinations. You review a source before saving it and can disable or remove it later.

If you enter a normal website address, STIQRA may look for that website's public list of article updates without opening the page as a browser. If it finds an update list on another website, you must review that address separately before it is used.

A publisher may change where its links lead. STIQRA checks redirects when they happen; an address that worked earlier can later be blocked. These checks reduce risk, but cannot guarantee that an unsafe destination was never contacted. Your device's security and network settings can add further protection.

STIQRA may remember limited details about recent source checks so it can avoid downloading unchanged updates or retrying too frequently. It does not store feed passwords or cookies. It does not extract full article text from publisher webpages.

An OPML file is a list of website subscriptions. When you import one, STIQRA shows the entries for review before adding them. Imported sources cannot refresh until they pass the usual checks. Details saved by a different app do not give STIQRA permission to contact new websites.

You can also back up subscriptions under Settings → Data Management → Subscriptions. This backup includes source addresses, names, and types, plus optional source preferences. It does not include articles, reading history, saved items, filters, reports, credentials, or device identifiers. Because a backup can reveal which websites you follow, keep exported copies private. You can export subscription backups using the system save controls on both macOS and iPhone or iPad.

When importing a subscription backup, review which entries to keep and whether to use their saved preferences. Invalid or duplicate entries can be skipped. New sources must pass validation before they are enabled; existing sources are not rechecked merely because you imported a backup. An interrupted or failed import must not be presented as completed.

A subscription backup is not a full device backup. Content held by other apps or services, including iCloud and device credentials, must be recovered through their own services. Files you export are outside STIQRA's Delete All Data action; delete those copies separately if needed.

Feed Stats and diagnostic traffic

Feed Stats are built from normal refresh behaviour and local durable observations. STIQRA does not send extra diagnostic feed requests just to explain source health. Source availability remains visible with fetch audits off and reports only bounded redacted facts. It also keeps feed failures separate from image/media failures.

Enabling fetch audits records future transport/image audit events only. It does not refresh feeds by itself, create diagnostic-only traffic, or change the durable source-health state. Resetting audits clears audit history, not source health.

Image safety

Article images come from external websites and are treated as untrusted input. Image URLs do not need to share the feed host or appear in a finite publisher/CDN allowlist. Image requests must use public HTTPS addresses, pass connection and redirect safety checks, and stay within resource limits. The image path inspects bytes instead of trusting filenames, extensions, content-type headers, or remote metadata by default. Within those bounds, decoder-valid publisher images are normalised rather than rejected merely for harmless encoder/container quirks; malformed, unsupported, oversized, repeatedly failing, or unsafe images can still be rejected, quarantined, normalised, or avoided. You can turn image loading off at any time.

Article images are on by default for new installs and are loaded through app-controlled image-loading paths. Images can be cached locally when appropriate. If an image is invalid, broken, unsafe, quarantined, or repeatedly fails, STIQRA can avoid showing it. You can turn Show Images off at any time, and STIQRA remembers that selection.

By default, STIQRA still saves bandwidth by not fetching images for articles your filters already ignore. The optional Fetch Images for Filtered Articles setting fetches those filtered-article images too, which can reduce what image servers infer from the difference between visible articles and filtered articles. Filtered article lists still stay text-only; open a filtered article preview to see an image when Show Images is enabled. Turning the setting off cancels queued app-owned filtered-image prefetching immediately, though a request already sent to the network may still finish.

Image Settings can copy quarantine diagnostics to the clipboard. Review diagnostics before sharing them because they can include source names or URLs for image hosts involved in troubleshooting.

Publisher media metadata and network behaviour

Feed responses can contain publisher audio, video, attachment, transcript, caption, or chapter URLs. STIQRA stores a bounded typed metadata record with the article so it can explain what the publisher supplied. The metadata path requires public HTTPS and rejects private/local destinations, unsupported declared types, suspicious MIME/file-extension mismatches, duplicates, and excessive entries.

Refreshing or displaying an article does not fetch the remote enclosure, transcript, caption, or chapter body. A supported audio request occurs only after you choose Download audio in article detail. Video, attachments, transcripts, captions, chapters, and explicit external-open actions follow the destination app's privacy rules after the leave-app confirmation.

Publisher audio downloads are stored on your device, with limits of 512 MiB per file, 1 GiB total, 100 files, and two simultaneous transfers. Unused downloads expire after 30 days; using a downloaded file renews that period. A cancelled or invalid download is not made playable. Downloads and queue entries do not sync between devices, but the listening position and played status for supported publisher audio can sync through optional iCloud Sync. Publisher downloads, queues, and listening history are not included in OPML or the current portable subscription backup. Importing a subscription does not download or play publisher media.

STIQRA remembers the local playback queue and can retain supported publisher listening progress after you remove an episode from the queue or delete its download. Progress can include where you stopped and whether you completed an episode. When iCloud Sync is enabled, supported publisher progress can appear on another device without transferring the audio file or queue. Removing a source clears its related local queue and listening history; Delete All Data clears local playback information. See Audio and iCloud Sync.

Clipboard actions

Copy and ChatGPT handoff actions can place article content or generated prompt text on the clipboard. Clipboard actions are user-initiated, and the clipboard is a system-wide feature on Apple platforms.

The clipboard is not a private app-to-app tunnel. Do not copy sensitive article content unless you are comfortable making that content available through the system clipboard.

Sharing and external apps

When you share, open externally, or hand content to another app, that destination controls what happens next. This includes browsers, ChatGPT, supported local integrations, mail clients, messaging apps, and file destinations.

For browser handoffs and explicit app handoffs, STIQRA warns before leaving the app and shows the destination. ChatGPT handoff keeps its separate prompt-copied confirmation. You can choose Don't remind me again on the external-open warning. To re-enable the warning later, open Settings → Security & Privacy and turn on Warn before opening links outside STIQRA.

Review content before sending it outside STIQRA. External destinations such as feeds, browsers, translation systems, AI tools, cloud services, mail clients, and messaging apps follow their own privacy and security rules after you send content to them.

Article Markdown file export is user initiated and bounded. STIQRA has the isolated file helper approve the exact UTF-8 export before the system save UI appears and verifies the completed file against that approval before reporting success. Native article sharing remains a visible host UI and uses bounded inert article text plus the shared safe public-output URL policy. STIQRA does not offer article printing, printer discovery, or a printer entitlement. On iOS, its article and image share sheets exclude the system Print activity; destinations outside STIQRA may offer independent output capabilities.

STIQRA does not need an AI service to collect, organise, and display articles from your chosen RSS/Atom sources. Clusters group articles locally without running an LLM. Optional AI workflows are explicit handoffs: STIQRA may prepare a prompt, copy it through a controlled clipboard path, and open another app or site after your action. Review the content before submitting it anywhere outside STIQRA.

Optional AI workflows can include article content, titles, URLs, summaries, and generated prompt text. The ChatGPT handoff path is explicit and user-mediated: choosing Send to ChatGPT authorises only that operation. STIQRA checks the prepared content and destination for that action, and confirms when it has copied the prompt. STIQRA does not provide local LLM/model generation.

For sensitive material, avoid external AI handoff and keep work inside local STIQRA features.

Unsupported newsletter sources

STIQRA does not offer newsletter signups, .eml import, forwarding, mailbox login, newsletter-source management, newsletter-text export, or cloud synchronisation of newsletter messages. The current release does not parse email messages or retrieve their remote images or attachments. Older development builds may have left local newsletter data that the current app no longer uses. Delete All Data removes residual app-owned local data; exported copies, device backups, and independently retained remote records are outside that local deletion. The local operation does not prove removal of copies outside STIQRA.

Imported files

STIQRA can import supported report files such as .stiqrareport. Treat imported files as external data. STIQRA checks and safely displays supported report files, but only import files from sources you trust. Current version-2 reports can store content-free input provenance: representation type, underlying publisher source for translations, a SHA-256 fingerprint, the exact canonical public HTTPS article URL, and capture time. They do not duplicate article text in that metadata. Canonical URLs with embedded or recognised explicit credential material are rejected, but ordinary query values can still be sensitive. Legacy version-1 reports remain supported without invented provenance.

Testing and verification posture

STIQRA is built with extensive tests and guard scripts that check important product boundaries, including secure ingress, generated docs, build assumptions, platform constraints, and integration contracts. These checks do not replace careful review, but they are part of how we keep the app's behaviour aligned with what the docs promise.

Destructive data reset

Delete All Data is a coordinated destructive reset with an explicit scope when a cloud sync copy exists. Delete From This Device first stops CloudKit transport and removes this device's local sync binding so the same launch cannot immediately rehydrate deleted state, then removes the local product data described below. Delete Everywhere first persists a durable account-scoped cloud-erase barrier, preserves only the minimum sync metadata needed to finish that erase, then removes local product data and requests deletion of STIQRA's private iCloud sync zone. While that deletion is pending, normal cloud rehydration stays blocked.

The local transaction stops background scheduling and drains pending app writes, then clears subscriptions, articles, read/seen/saved/archive state, filters and Track state, metrics and health/audit history, reports, translations and local analysis state, generated audio plus queue/resume metadata, images and caches, preferences, local diagnostic records, and any residual retired macOS handoff secret. The Settings sheet dismisses only after the requested transaction reports success. If local cleanup fails or a requested cloud erase is still pending, the app reports that bounded state instead of claiming success. This is still not a cryptographic erase. Platform-managed backups can later restore app-container data, and files exported, copied, shared, or stored in another app are outside this transaction.

An incomplete local reset keeps a small recovery record. STIQRA warns after restart if deletion did not finish or its status cannot be read. Resolve any storage issue and retry before relying on the reset; a successful verified reset removes that record.

Removing one feed is also narrower than Delete All Data, but it now verifies its own local cleanup before removing the subscription record. STIQRA removes that feed's active and archived articles, source metrics and audit rows, and article-scoped read, seen, saved, category, report, cache and local-analysis state only when another source does not still reference the same canonical article. The confirmation says that exclusive local articles and source-specific history are permanently removed while shared articles remain. If the removed source identifier is also an alias of a retained feed, removal fails closed instead of guessing ownership; retained aliases are also preserved during Track, selection, and bootstrap cleanup. Source and article references are removed from local assistive provenance state. If a required store is locked or cannot confirm persistence, the subscription stays listed and the app warns that partial cleanup may already have started. Generic shared image-cache entries are not treated as source-owned and remain subject to normal eviction, one awaited Clear Image Cache operation, or Delete All Data.

Other cleanup actions are narrower. Clear RSS Cache removes cached feed/article data without removing feed preferences, keyword lists, saved lists, archive state, or the audio queue. Clear Image Cache removes cached images. Clear all AI reports removes saved AI reports; Clear local analysis outputs removes separately saved local analysis outputs in supported builds. Neither action removes source articles. Audio library delete actions remove selected generated audio items and their queue entries where available. Article-detail Delete download removes publisher audio and its queue entries. Removing an item from Up Next does not delete its audio file. Removing a source deletes publisher-audio downloads owned by that source, and Delete All includes the publisher-media store.

Back up anything important before using destructive reset.

Security Features (local runtime verification)

Open Settings → Security & Privacy → Open Security Features Audit to see what the current app process reports. The main result, Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE), can be Active, Not active, or Unavailable. The page also shows other available protections and lets you expand Verified locally using system security APIs for details.

Not active does not mean your device is insecure. Some protections need newer hardware, a compatible operating system, and the appropriate signed app build. Unavailable means the app cannot read that result. A reported active protection does not guarantee that every possible attack is prevented. These checks are local to your device; they are not sent to STIQRA's Diagnostics log or to XMAKYNA.

Optional local Diagnostics

Open Settings → Security & Privacy → Diagnostics if you need help investigating an app problem. Diagnostics is off by default. When enabled, it keeps a small, local log of fixed app-health codes and how often they occurred. It does not record article text, website addresses, reading history, account details, passwords, or raw network responses.

STIQRA does not automatically upload this log. If support requests it, choose Copy Diagnostics, review what was copied, and decide whether to share it. Turning Diagnostics off deletes its local log. For help with specific codes, see XMAKYNA support asks for an error code.

What to do before sharing logs or screenshots

Before sharing diagnostics publicly:

  • Check screenshots for article titles, sources, or private feeds.
  • Remove personal search terms.
  • Avoid exposing private feed URLs.
  • Avoid sharing generated prompts that include sensitive article content.
  • Export or copy only the smallest amount of information necessary.

Practical privacy checklist

  • Review and approve only the exact public HTTPS feed origins you intend to contact.
  • Keep sensitive sources disabled when not needed.
  • Use local filters and Saved instead of external handoff for sensitive research.
  • Review prompts before pasting into external AI tools.
  • Use destructive reset only when you intentionally want to clear app data.

Network behaviour model

STIQRA's network behaviour should be understandable from the feature you are using.

ActivityWhy network may be usedWho chose it
Feed refreshFetch articles from exact public HTTPS RSS/Atom origins you approved for each enabled subscription.You approved and enabled that source.
Image loadingLoad public HTTPS article images when image loading is enabled, with connected-address, redirect, response-size, byte-format, and decode checks on every origin.You choose image behaviour in settings and by reading supported sources.
Browser openOpen an article or source outside STIQRA.You initiated the external open.
Share, export, copy, or handoffMove content to another app or destination.You initiated the action.
Report or audio workflowsPrepare generated text, reports, transcripts, or audio from selected article inputs where supported.You chose the article set and workflow.
Feed StatsUses normal refresh/image behaviour already happening; it should not create diagnostic-only feed probes.You use the app and source diagnostics.

What should not be part of normal reading:

  • advertising SDK calls;
  • tracker SDK calls;
  • analytics SDK calls;
  • a required XMAKYNA feed proxy;
  • background phone-home behaviour unrelated to your reading task.

Source ordering, output preferences, and provenance

Source order, chosen output language and summary length, and limited information about saved reports are kept in local app data. They can reveal your source choices and reading preferences, so protect device backups accordingly. This information does not create a duplicate copy of your article text or passwords.

Your selected Clusters timeframe, such as Yesterday, is remembered on your device. Clusters are prepared locally and are not automatically sent to an external AI service.

Retired article reading-state data

STIQRA no longer restores the last article you opened, your reading position, or the last selected section after relaunch. Older data used for this purpose is cleaned up during startup. This does not remove read/unread status, Saved, Archive, or audio playback progress.

Login-protected feed support and older saved secrets

Authenticated RSS/Atom feeds are not supported. Feed requests carry no user credentials or cookies, and there is no login editor. Article-page text extraction is also unsupported, including authenticated extraction. Older credential material is deletion-only, never used to authorise a new article fetch.

A Keychain service from earlier releases may still contain obsolete protected-feed credentials. These cannot be used for feed requests. Delete All Data also removes this legacy Keychain service and reports incomplete deletion if removal fails. A previous source-deletion transaction may replay an old credential-cleanup step. Exports and backups do not include live credentials, and external device backups are outside STIQRA deletion.

Article-page text extraction (unsupported)

Article-page text extraction is not supported. STIQRA reads only text provided by subscribed RSS/Atom feeds and other supported imported sources. There is no Extract article text button, automatic page extraction, per-source extraction setting, extraction cache screen, or article-credential editor. Open the original article in your external browser when the feed does not include its full text.

Older installations may still have leftover data or saved credentials from the retired feature. STIQRA does not use them to retrieve new articles. Removing a source or choosing Delete All Data cleans up the applicable old data, but does not erase copies you previously exported or backed up elsewhere.

Network-route diagnostics

When fetch audits are enabled, Feed Stats can show only whether the operating system's task metrics reported a proxy, reported a direct route, or did not provide route evidence. STIQRA does not store proxy credentials, proxy addresses, PAC details, VPN identity, interface names, or private route information. System-managed proxies, VPNs, content filters, and captive portals can still block or alter connectivity; STIQRA does not bypass them or provide an in-app captive-portal sign-in.

Loopback-address, private-network, link-local, and metadata-service feeds remain unsupported in normal mode. Use a publisher-provided public HTTPS feed or manage a trusted bridge outside STIQRA.

At-rest protection and retention

STIQRA does not claim its own encryption layer for ordinary local stores. Current builds do not store or use feed or article-page extraction credentials for network access. Older Keychain secrets may remain until source deletion or Delete All Data cleanup succeeds. Local files rely on documented platform protection and platform-managed backup settings.

Durable stores are bounded or user-controlled and participate in source deletion and Delete All Data. This includes fetch audits, reports and caches, generated audio, and publisher-audio downloads. Publisher audio is additionally limited by count, total quota, per-file size, and a 30-day unused retention window. Copies exported elsewhere follow the destination's own protection, synchronisation, retention, and deletion behaviour.

Portable backup sensitivity

Portable subscription backups exclude Keychain secrets, authorisation headers, cookies, credential references, device identifiers, and absolute local paths. They preserve exact feed URLs. A publisher can embed an opaque token in a path or unusual query field, so .stiqrabackup files should be handled as sensitive and are not described as generically token-free.

Legacy article-page credentials (deletion only)

Article-page credentials are legacy deletion-only data, not supported authentication for current articles or feeds. Earlier versions could store article-specific HTTP Basic or Bearer secrets in the system Keychain, with associated metadata for an exact HTTPS origin. Current STIQRA does not use these secrets for requests, prompt for them, or offer an article-credential editor. Source removal and Delete All Data continue to clean up applicable legacy Keychain items and report incomplete deletion when cleanup fails. Legacy secrets are not exported as live credentials. External device backups and copies remain outside STIQRA's deletion boundary.

STIQRA does not provide article-page login, cookies, browser sessions, form submission, OAuth/SSO, CAPTCHA handling, or authenticated article extraction. Article-page HTTP 401 responses cannot be resolved by configuring article credentials in STIQRA.

Custom Backup privacy

Settings → Data Management → Custom Backup lets you choose which local information to export. Your file may contain website addresses, article links, reading activity, keywords, reports, transcripts, and media details. Treat the backup as private, even though it does not include passwords, sign-in cookies, downloaded images, or downloaded audio files.

Imported subscriptions do not automatically gain permission to contact websites. You can request validation during import or use Validate and enable all pending subscriptions afterwards. Sources that cannot be checked safely stay disabled. STIQRA also checks backup contents before importing them; an older or invalid file may be rejected. Keep exported files in a safe place, and remember that deleting STIQRA's data does not delete copies stored elsewhere.

Publisher pictures and audio are checked before they are used. These checks reduce exposure to damaged or unsafe media, but cannot guarantee every file will load or every platform component is free of vulnerabilities.

Helper security observations

On macOS, iPhone and iPad, Settings → Security & Privacy → Open Security Features Audit lists all seven isolated helpers. Check Helpers explicitly starts read-only diagnostic connections; simply opening Settings starts none. Each helper queries its own OS security information and reports four supported protection flags through its existing authenticated helper connection (ExtensionKit on macOS 26+ and iOS 26+). The label identifies this as helper-reported information, distinct from the main app independently examining the helper process. No credentials, documents, feed content or network responses are part of the diagnostic reply, and no security-state history is saved by STIQRA.

A successful observation distinguishes active and inactive flags. Helper headings show Observed (Active) or Observed (Not active) for the reported MIE flag; the expanded rows show each protection separately. A missing observation is Not checked, an unavailable OS result is Unavailable, and an unsuccessful connection or response is Verification failed. When a connection ends, its observation becomes Stale and is not shown as current. Diagnostic connections close when the audit page disappears, not merely when the app becomes inactive or enters the background. Hardware and OS versions affect available protections. Neither signed entitlements nor another process’s security state prove a helper’s runtime protection. Hardware memory tagging is the core MIE protection; it does not establish every MIE component, fault-handling mode, helper PAC, or extension sandbox requirements.

Opening Notification Centre or switching apps does not end an audit check. Leaving the audit page closes its diagnostic connections; actual helper interruptions still invalidate observations.